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Introduction
How should we as a society value changes in population size? The ques-
tion may be crucial when evaluating global warming scenarios. I de-
fend the intuition of neutrality, which answers a part of the question. It
states that – other things being equal – it is ethically irrelevant whether
or not additional people are added to a population. The argument
against neutrality criticizes the intuition of neutrality as inconsistent.
The contribution of this thesis is twofold: First, the framework of welfare
economics, the intuition of neutrality, and the argument against neutral-
ity are presented with formal rigour. Second, the formalizations will be
used for a critical analysis of the argument against neutrality. Three ethi-
cal frameworks will be assumed – the difference principle, average util-
itarianism, and contractarianism –, and their relation to the explicit and
hidden premises of the argument against neutrality will be investigated.
The result will be that all three frameworks are compatible with the in-
tuition of neutrality (or slightly modified versions); so the argument against
neutrality does not hold within them.
The analysis is built on several controversial philosophical views and
does not necessarily disprove the argument against neutrality. Rather, it
undermines the authority of the argument by pointing out the weakness
of several premises within the three frameworks.
I begin by briefly introducing the framework of welfare economics,
which this essay argues within. I then present in more detail the intuition
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of neutrality and the formal argument brought forward against it. The
main part is dedicated to the development of three lines of argumen-
tation in opposition to the argument against neutrality (thus defending
the intuition of neutrality). I conclude with a systematic summary of the
three lines of argumentation.
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Chapter 1
Exposition
1.1 Welfare Economics
Welfare economics is the theory how individual well-being should be ag-
gregated to general well-being (or welfare). General well-being drives
decisions in the welfare state. The theory is relevant for the execution as
well as the design of economic policies. As in democracies the citizens
and their representatives take part in the design process, welfare eco-
nomics is subject to societal discourse in these nations. Within this dis-
course, citizens and media often do not only claim their own interests.
Instead they also refer to ethical principles which are to guide demo-
cratic policy decisions. This essay is set within this democratic discourse
and aims to defend a supposedly widespread intuition whose consis-
tency has been challenged from the academic side.
The core of welfare economics is the welfare function (see Harsanyi,
1955, p. 309). It is an aggregation function: a function which takes in the
individual levels of well-being of several individual persons, and delivers
the level of welfare for the whole aggregated population comprising
these individual persons. Well-being and welfare (which refers to ag-
gregated well-being) are abstract terms. They are usually interpreted
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as a representation derived from a person’s preferences about different
lives (cf. Crisp, 2017, ch. 4.2). But they can also be interpreted simply
as hedonic levels of lifetime pleasure (Crisp, 2017, ch. 4.1), which will be
sufficient for the purpose of this thesis. Well-being (or utility) of a person p
is denoted by u(p); individual persons are denoted by pi – the subscript
is just there to differentiate between different persons. In similar fashion,
welfare of a population P = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} is denoted by u(P).
Definition 1: Welfare Function
w : R|P|+ → R+, {u(p1), u(p2), . . . , u(pn)} 7→ u({p1, p2, . . . , pn})
The content of the general welfare function is intentionally unspec-
ified. The function is just a vehicle for discussion within welfare eco-
nomics. Several specific welfare functions have been proposed and we
will deal with two of them in later sections. For example, the classical
utilitarian welfare function states that welfare is simply the sum u(p1) +
u(p2) + . . . + u(pn) of all individual well-being.
I introduce welfare functions because they are precise formalizations
of competing ethical beliefs. In sections 2.1 and 2.2, I will make use of
them in order to demonstrate that when we assume certain ethical in-
tuitions, the argument against neutrality does not hold. I will present two
widespread competing ethical belief systems – average utilitarianism,
and the difference principle – and try to refute the argument against
neutrality from each of these views. The idea is that many people will
adhere to one of these principles so that they can agree with at least
one of the refutations. (Section 2.3 is of a different kind because, rather
than to specific welfare functions, it relates to their justification.)
It should be briefly noted that welfare economics are blind – and so
will be this discussion – in that they are consequentialist. This means that
they only evaluate actions by their outcome and in this context specif-
ically by their impact on general welfare or goodness. Other elements
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of ethical evaluation, such as the procedural requirements of justice, will
have to be considered separately (cf. Broome, 2005, p. 401; Broome,
2012, p. 99f). These separate considerations will often require conse-
quentialist considerations as part of their theoretical foundation, so this
discussion may be indirectly relevant for them.
1.2 The intuition of neutrality
The intuition of neutrality is assumed to be a widespread ethical intuition
among humans (Broome, 2012, p. 176f). The content of the intuition
is called the principle of equal existence (Broome, 2004, p. 146), but
usually (and also in this thesis) the term ’intuition’ is used to refer both to
the empirical intuition of neutrality and to the propositional content of
the intuition of neutrality.
The content of the intuition is defined as follows: Let us assume two
hypothetical scenarios A and B. The same people exist in both scenar-
ios, except that in scenario B there are some additional people which
do not exist in scenario A. The intuition says: Which one of the scenarios
is better depends entirely on the well-being of the people who exist in
both scenarios, and not at all on the additional people who only exist in
B – as long as all the additional people in B have a well-being within a
certain neutral range. More specifically, as long as the additional peo-
ple in B are within the neutral range, scenario A is better in terms of wel-
fare if the people who exist in both populations have a higher welfare
in scenario A, and scenario B is better in terms of welfare if the people
who exist in both populations have a higher welfare in scenario B.
We can formalize the scenarios as different welfare distributions rep-
resented by the welfare functions uA and uB (read: u under the circum-
stances of scenario A, and u under the circumstances of scenario B). Let
P0 be a population of people who exist in both scenarios but need not
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have the same levels of well-being in both scenarios. Let P+ be the pop-
ulation of people who exist only in scenario B. Let [u1, u2] be the neutral
range of well-being for added people.
Definition 2: The intuition of neutrality
∃u1, u2 :
(∀x ∈ P+ : uB(x) ∈ [u1, u2])→
(uB(P0) > uA(P0)→ uB(P0 ∪ P+) > uA(P0)) ∧
(uB(P0) < uA(P0)→ uB(P0 ∪ P+) < uA(P0))
The formalization is to be interpreted in the following way: It does not
matter in terms of welfare whether there exists an additional person in
the population who lives at a moderate level of well-being. There are
several moderate levels of well-beings, which form a range between a
low moderate level of well-being u1 and a high moderate level of well-
being u2. If however the additional person is at a very low level of well-
being – below u1 – then the person might matter for the calculation of
general well-being. (Arguably, the welfare would decrease because of
the added person; though this is not specified by the intuition.) Similarly,
if the additional person is at a very high level of well-being – above u2 –
then the person might matter for the calculation of general well-being.
(Arguably, the welfare would increase because of the added person.)
There is a specification of the intuition of neutrality where the neutral
range has no upper limit, i. e., u2 = ∞ (Broome, 2012, p. 113). This may
be an accurate of common belief. Whether the upper limit of the range
is finite or infinite is of minor concern for this thesis; it is more important to
note that there is some neutral range.
If the range is sufficiently large, this might simplify welfare calculations,
as the following examples demonstrate:
• An exemplary application of the intuition is the evaluation of road
safety (Broome, 2004, p. 144f). In this context, the deaths of people
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dying in accidents must be weighed against the costs of prevent-
ing them. Whilst this is an ethically difficult problem on its own, one
important long-term effect is usually left aside: The well-being of
the expected potential offspring of the potentially dying person is
completely neglected. One possible justification is the intuition of
neutrality: According to the intuition, if we can expect the offspring
to live within the neutral range of well-being, it is neither positive nor
negative whether they exist or not.
• A second example is the evaluation of different scenarios of global
warming (Broome, 2012, p. 170). Global warming is likely to kill
many people and thereby to prevent their offspring from existing.
On the other hand, global warming may increase poverty, which is
associated with higher birth rates. Thanks to the intuition of neu-
trality we can simply leave both of these effects aside in many
of our evaluations – which comes handy as predictions in these
domains attend to an enormous amount of uncertainty. Broome,
2012, p. 120ff. sees massive problems if the intuition of neutrality
cannot be assumed to apply.
It is important to understand that the intuition of neutrality does not
imply neutrality about the consequences on the existing population which
are caused by the additional population. These consequences may
be negative or positive, leading to contrary political reactions such as
China’s restrictive one-child-policy and Europe’s reproduction-promoting
policy (Broome, 2012, p. 169). The consequences on the existing popu-
lation may well determine whether additional people are good or not.
Only the well-being of the additional people themselves does not do so
according to the intuition of neutrality.
The question whether the intuition of neutrality is in fact a widespread
intuition among humans appears not to have been investigated. It is
not necessary for the argument against neutrality to assume such an
8
empirical fact. Neither is it necessary for the refutation of this argument
to assume so. If however this refutation were successful and the integrity
of the intuition thus restored, then it would be desirable to investigate
the empirical prevalence of the intuition.
1.3 The argument against neutrality
Theorem: The argument against neutrality
The intuition of neutrality (Def. 2) is incorrect.
The argument against (the intuition of) neutrality (described in Broome,
2012, p. 176f) concludes that the intuition of neutrality is inconsistent.
The argument is a version of the mere addition paradox (Broome, 2004,
p. 148) and a modification of the adoption problem (Broome, 2004,
p. 161). The argument against neutrality takes the logical form of a re-
duction to the absurd: It assumes that the intuition of neutrality applies,
deduces a contradiction, and thus concludes that the intuition is incor-
rect. This section summarizes and formalizes the argument as stated in
?, ?, Broome, 2012.
Premise 1: Intuition of neutrality (P1)
The intuition of neutrality is right (see Definition 2).
The deduction of the contradiction is based on the following coun-
terexample:
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Counterexample: The situation in the argument against neutrality
(A1) Let A, B, C be scenarios with corresponding distributions of
well-being uA, uB , uC and
populations PA = P0,PB = PC = P0 ∪ P+, and
some person p ∈ P0
such that uA(P0 \ {p}) = uB(P0 \ {p}) = uC (P0 \ {p}).
(A2) Let uB(p) > uA(p).
(A3) Let uC (p) < uA(p).
(A4) Let P+ = {q} with uB(q), uC (q) ∈ [u1, u2]
(A5) Let uB(p) + uB(q) < uC (p) + uC (q).
(A6) Let inequality gB(P0 ∪ P+) > gC (P0 ∪ P+) (see below).
The well-being of the persons in scenarios A, B and C with corresponding utility
functions ua, ub , uc . Person p is the right person in A and the second person from
the right in B and C. Person q is the rightmost person in B and C. Copied from
Broome, 2012, p. 177.
There are three scenarios A, B and C. They share the same popula-
tion, except that one additional person exists in both B and C. In both B
and C the additional person has a level of well-being within the neutral
range. The argument is structured into two major steps:
First, scenario A is being compared to scenario B and to scenario C.
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The additional person can be neglected in this step because the person
is within the neutral range. There is one person who is a little bit better
off in scenario B than in scenario A. As all other persons have exactly the
same level of well-being, it is reasonable that there is a higher welfare
in scenario B than in scenario A. Contrarily, there is one person who is a
little bit worse off in scenario C than in scenario A. As all other persons
have exactly the same level of well-being, it is reasonable that there is
a higher welfare in scenario A than in scenario C. As a consequence of
these two observations, scenario B has a higher welfare than scenario C.
Technically, this conclusion requires transitivity of the betterness relation.
Premise 2: Transitivity of betterness (P2)
uX (P) > uY (Q) ∧ uY (Q) > uZ (R)
→ uX (P) > uZ (R)
Second, scenario B is compared directly to scenario C. Both scenar-
ios comprise the same people, so there is no additional person in either
scenario who could be neglected. The person who is not present in
scenario A and has therefore been neglected above is much better off
in scenario C than in scenario B. This big difference clearly outweighs
the difference of the other person’s well-being in favour of scenario B.
As there is moreover a lower inequality in scenario C, scenario C has a
higher welfare than scenario B. This is in contradiction to the result of step
one, so the counter-example refutes the intuition of neutrality, which has
been its core assumption.
Whilst the argument above is intuitively plausible, it has two other im-
portant premises (Broome, 2012, p. 177f): First, if in two scenarios all per-
sons have the same level of well-being except for one person who is
better off in the second scenario, then the welfare in the second sce-
nario is higher than in the first. Technically, we can say that the second
scenario Pareto dominates the first (Osborne, 1997). (I will come back
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to this notion in section 2.1.)
Premise 3: Pareto domination (P3)
1. ∃p ∈ P :
uX (a) > uY (p) ∧
∀q ∈ P \ {p} : uX (q) = uY (q))
→ uX (P) > uY (P)
2. ∃p ∈ P :
uX (a) < uY (p) ∧
∀q ∈ P \ {p} : uX (q) = uY (q))
→ uX (P) < uY (P)
Second, if in two scenarios with the same population the sum of in-
dividual well-being is higher in the second scenario, and at the same
time the inequality of the distribution of well-being is lower in the second
scenario, then the second scenario is better in terms of welfare than the
first. I call this the fair aggregation principle.
Premise 4: Fair aggregation principle (P4)
∑
p∈P uX (p) >
∑
p∈P uY (p) ∧
gX (P) < gY (P)
→ uX (P) > uY (P)
with suitable inequality function g (see below).
There are various ways to measure inequality, and the details need
not concern us here. An excellent survey of one-dimensional inequality
measures – as applied in welfare economics – is given in Sen & Foster,
1997. The most prominent inequality measure is probably the Gini coef-
ficient (see Ceriani & Verme, 2012). Both of these premises appear to
be very plausible, and they are dubbed ”hard-to-doubt assumptions” in
Broome, 2012, p. 176.
The following proof concisely sums up the argument presented above.
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It makes use of the technical premises (P...) and the assumptions that
make up the setting of the counter-example (A...). We can infer from
the contradiction in (C8) that at least one of the premises and assump-
tions must be false. The assumptions merely describe the setting of the
scenarios as depicted in the figure above. They are simply the assump-
tions making up the counter-example and there is no reason to doubt
them within this proof. Moreover, premises (P2), (P3) and (P4) appear to
be very plausible. As a consequence, the intuition of neutrality must be
the false premise.
Proof 1: The argument against neutrality
(C1) (P3) ∧ (A1) ∧ (A2)⇒ uB(P0) > uA(P0)
(C2) (P3) ∧ (A1) ∧ (A3)⇒ uC (P0) < uA(P0)
(C3) (C1) ∧ (P1) ∧ (A4)⇒ uB(P0 ∪ P+) > uA(P0)
(C4) (C2) ∧ (P1) ∧ (A4)⇒ uC (P0 ∪ P+) < uA(P0)
(C5) (C3) ∧ (C4) ∧ (P2)⇒ uB(P0 ∪ P+) > uC (P0 ∪ P+)
(C6) (A1) ∧ (A5)⇒∑x∈P0 uB(x) <∑x∈P0 uC (x)
(C7) (C6) ∧ (P4) ∧ (A6)⇒ uB(P0 ∪ P+) < uC (P0 ∪ P+)
(C8) (C4)⇔ ¬(C7)
(C9) (C8) ∧ (A1− A6) ∧ (P2) ∧ (P3) ∧ (P4)⇒ ¬(P1)
There are two major implications if this argument holds and the intu-
ition of neutrality is inconsistent (cf. Broome, 2005, p. 411:
1. We as a society would have to develop a different, consistent prin-
ciple to replace the intuition. We do not even currently know whether
population changes should be evaluated as positive or as neg-
ative, just that they cannot simply be evaluated as neutral. The
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finding of a new principle with wide acceptance would certainly
present a major societal task and require many years of discourse.
2. As soon as we had found a suitable principle, we would need
to gain better knowledge of which actions lead to which conse-
quences with respect to population changes. Only then would we
probably be able to apply a principle which is not based on neu-
trality. This requires new scientific analysis and simulation because
such predictions have often been omitted in the past (Broome,
2005, p. 402; Broome, 2012, p. 115f).
Broome, 2004 develops five possible responses to the argument against
neutrality (see the overview on p. 149). Accordingly, one of the following
alternative propositions could be embraced:
(a) intransitivity of the betterness relation
(b) conditional goodness
(c) relative goodness
(d) indeterminacy or vagueness of the betterness relation
(e) a single neutral level
The transitivity of the betterness relation (P2) is plausibly defended in
(a) – see Broome, 2004, p. 151f. (P3) and (P4) have not been discussed
so far. This is what I will do in section 2.1. Section 2.2 will be very similar
to what Broome, 2004 develops with regard to proposition (d), but it
will also be compatible with proposition (e). I will pursue a somewhat
related approach to (b) and (c) in section 2.3.
14
Chapter 2
Critical analysis
2.1 Aggregation and justice
I will start by delivering some general criticism on Pareto domination
and aggregation and then continue to examine their relation to justice-
oriented welfare functions, specifically the Maximin and Leximin rule.
When we say that a scenario Pareto dominates another scenario,
we mean that at least one person is better off in this scenario than in
the other while all other persons are at an equal level of well-being. The
Pareto principle I have formulated as (P2) says that in such cases the
first scenario has a higher welfare than the other one. This principle,
as well as the extending requirement of Pareto efficiency (cf. Osborne,
1997), find their due place in economics where the objective is the effi-
cient allocation of scarce resources (Samuelson & Nordhaus, 2010, p. 4;
Lange, 2019). However I doubt that they are suitable as ethical princi-
ples. Pareto efficiency has been criticized because the liberal paradox
suggests that it may be incompatible with procedural elements of lib-
eralism (see Sen & Foster, 1997). But I believe that there is a more gen-
eral problem with Pareto efficiency and even with Pareto domination:
Consider a large population with one person whose well-being is much
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higher than the well-being of the others. Is it ethically desirable – is there
a higher welfare – if the welll-being of this person is increased even more,
while the well-being of the other persons remains the same? This can be
intuitively doubted, and below I show some mildly convincing reasoning
in favour of this doubt.
A similar criticism applies to what I have called the fair aggregation
principle. The fair aggregation principle is a combination of what can
be called the simple aggregation principle – that general welfare is the
simple sum of all individual well-being – with the additional requirement
that distributions need be more equal to have a higher welfare. The
principle is non-exhaustive: it does not tell us anything about populations
with a higher sum of well-being and a lower equality, and it does not tell
us anything about populations with a lower sum of well-being and a
higher equality. But that is not a problem, since such populations do not
play a relevant role in the counter-example to the intuition of neutrality.
The problem with the requirement of equality is that, analytically,
equality is a global criterion, which means that it somehow takes into
account the well-being of every single person. This implies that a small
decrease  in well-being of the person who already is worst off can al-
ways be compensated by some large increase of equality within the
rest of the population. This follows because otherwise the well-being of
the worst-off person would completely determine the equality – which is
intuitively plausible, but not incorporated in the conception of inequality
measures.
Now imagine three scenarios, all with the same people: In scenario
X there is some utility distribution with lots of inequality. The person who
is worst off in scenario X is called p. In scenario Y, the well-being of
the worst-off person from scenario X is decreased by some very small
amount . Due to the globality of inequality, this can be compensated
in terms of equality by improving the equality within all the other persons
to a more or less drastical amount. Let us assume that such compensa-
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tion has taken place, so that the overall equality in scenario Y is higher
than in scenario X. With the usual inequality functions this will be possible
without decreasing the sum of well-being (cf. Ceriani & Verme, 2012).
Let us further assume that in a third scenario Z all people are at the
same level of well-being as the people in scenario Y, plus 2 . The general
equality has not decreased in Z in comparison to Y. (Depending on the
inequality function, it may even have increased, because the relative
differences between the least well-off and the most well-off have de-
creased.) However the sum of well-being is increased in Z in comparison
to X because the well-being of many persons has been increased by 2
while the well-being of only one person has been decreased by 2 . As
a consequence, both the sum of individual well-being and the equality
are better in Z than in X, so according to the fair aggregation principle
there is a higher welfare in Z than in X. At the same time, the worst-off
person in X is even worse off in Z. This seems intuitively implausible and I
will now present a theory which explains this implausibility.
For this objection I will use as a specific welfare function the differ-
ence principle. The difference principle is a concept which is inferred
from an analysis of justice. Its justification as the second principle of
justice is given and extensively discussed in (Rawls, 2005, pp. 3-183).
Rivalling average utilitarianism, the difference principle is probably the
most prominent and most widely accepted welfare function. In its core
formula, the difference principle states that differences from socioeco-
nomic equality are only permitted if they are to the benefit of the least
advantaged (Rawls, 2005, p. 302). This implies that society should aim to
optimize the status of the least advantaged. The difference principle is
therefore usually represented as a welfare function where general wel-
fare is determined only by the well-being of the group with the lowest
level of well-being. (Such representation commits a major error in ignor-
ing the difference between primary goods and well-being as I discuss
in Pomerenke, 2017, p. 12f. – But this does not bear upon the reasoning
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here, which is based solely on Pareto comparisons.) Whilst the difference
principle refers to the least advantaged group – which makes sense in
application – there is no mistake in referring to the least advantaged
person for the sake of theory (cf. (Rawls, 2005, p. 98)). Because of its
resemblance to the decision-theoretic rule of minimum maximization,
this formulation of the principle has also been called the Maximin rule.
(Although this labelling has been rightly criticized in Rawls & Kelly, 2001,
p. 43..)
Definition 3: Difference principle / ”Maximin”
w(P) = minp∈P u(p)
According to the difference principle in its Maximin version, both Pa-
reto domination and fair aggregation are false: Imagine that one per-
son who is not the worst-off in either scenario is better off in the first
scenario than in the second while all other persons are equally well off.
Then Pareto domination requires that the first scenario has a higher wel-
fare. The Maximin rule, however, states that both scenarios have the
same welfare because the well-being of the worst-off person has not
changed. And we have seen above that as a consequence of fair
aggregation a scenario may be evaluated as having a higher welfare
even if the worst-off person is even worse off – in strict contradiction to
the difference principle.
But the difference principle in its Maximin formulation has been de-
signed as a simplification with the practical idea in mind that there will
seldom or never be a comparison in which the least advantaged will
have the exactly same level of well-being in both scenarios. Yet for the
theoretical case of a such comparison a more elaborate rule than the
Maximin rule has been developed (cf. Rawls, 2005, p. 83): It says that
in the case that the least advantaged are at the same level in both
scenarios, the second-least advantaged must be regarded. And if the
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second-least advantaged are also at the same level, then the third-least
advantaged must be regarded, and so on. Because it resembles a lex-
icographical sorting algorithm, the extended rule is called the Leximin
rule. It is most clearly formulated as a recursive selection function which
outputs the better population of two populations whose members are
sorted in ascending order according to their well-being:
Definition 4: Difference principle / ”Leximin” selection function
The set of the best population(s) of two populations S = s1, ..., sn
and T = t1, ..., tn which are sorted in ascending by well-being, i.
e.,
• u(s1) ≤ ... ≤ u(sn),
• u(t1) ≤ ... ≤ u(tn),
is given by
lexiMin(S = s1...sn,T = t1...tn) =

{S ,T} for S = T = ∅
{S} for u(s1) > u(t1)
{T} for u(s1) < u(t1)
lexiMin ((s2, ..., sn), (t2, ..., tn)) for u(s1) = u(t1)
We can easily observe that – unlike the Maximin rule – the Leximin
rule is compatible with Pareto domination: If all persons are equal in
two scenarios except one who is better off in the second scenario, then
the Leximin algorithm will recursively call another instance of the Lex-
imin algorithm (where the worst-off from the outer instance will be disre-
garded), until an instance is called where the two persons in questions
are the worst-off persons in their respective scenarios. This process au-
tomatically ensures Pareto domination. So at a second glance at the
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difference principle, it does not contradict but indeed rather support
Pareto domination. This is in favour of the argument against neutrality.
The same, however, cannot be said about the relation of the differ-
ence principle to the principle of fair aggregation. We have seen above
that fair aggregation in some cases evaluates distributions as being bet-
ter than a second distribution even though the worst-off person is bet-
ter off in the second distribution. In such a case, the Leximin algorithm
would stop in the first iteration, with a result equivalent to the result of the
Maximin rule. The algorithm would not regard the improved well-being
of all the other persons, because not only the Maximin rule but also the
Leximin rule deem all general improvements irrelevant if they are to the
disadvantage of the least advantaged. So for one major welfare func-
tion the ”hard-to-doubt” premise of fair aggregation (P4) is false and the
argument against neutrality cannot succeed.
At the beginning of this section, two intuitive objections to the Pareto
principle and the fair aggregation principle have been raised. The ob-
jection to the Pareto principle appeared to be supported by assuming
the difference principle as a welfare function; however it turned out that
the difference principle is only contradictory to the Pareto principle in its
Maximin formulation, not in the more general and theoretically prefer-
able formulation as the Leximin rule. The objection to the fair aggre-
gation principle, however, was supported by both the Maximin and the
Leximin formulation of the difference principle. As the fair aggregation
principle is a necessary premise for the argument against neutrality, the
argument therefore fails when the difference principle is assumed as a
welfare function.
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2.2 The neutral range
Whilst section 2.1 has dealt with the implications of assuming the differ-
ence principle as a welfare function, this section deals with a second
popular welfare function, that is average utilitarianism.
I will start by explaining how the argument against neutrality requires
the neutral range to be a proper range rather than a single level. After-
wards, I will try to make plausible why (assuming average utilitarianism)
we should rather assume a single neutral level in theory and elucidate
how, taking uncertainty into account, this single neutral level may ap-
proach a proper neutral range in practice.
So far, the formalization of the intuition of neutrality involves a neutral
range [u1, u2] without specifying u1 or u2. As per Definition 2, the neu-
tral range could in fact just be a single number with u1 = u2; but the
interpretation of the intuition of neutrality tells us that this range is in fact
supposed to be a proper range and rather large.
The argument against neutrality, however, could be misunderstood
as an argument against any kind of neutral range. The superficial reader
– understanding that the argument denies the possibility of a neutral
range – may suppose that it denies the possibility of any neutral range.
I want to ward off this potential misunderstanding: As demonstrated
below, the argument against neutrality only denies the possibility of a
proper real range, that is, it denies that the intuition of neutrality holds
for u1 6= u2.
A careful analysis of the argument against neutrality yields that it in-
terprets the intuition of neutrality in a way that does not permit that the
neutral range is just a single level of well-being: In order to neutralize and
counter the positive difference in well-being for person p between sce-
narios B and C, the difference in well-being between scenarios B and C
for person q must be negative. So the neutral range must allow for such
a difference, because the well-being of both p and q is to be within the
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neutral range:
Corollary 1: Proper neutral range
(C10) (A2) ∧ (A3)⇒ uB(p) > uC (p)
(C11) (C10) ∧ (A5)⇒ uB(q) < uC (q)
(C12) (C11) ∧ (A4)⇒ u1 < u2
Formally (C12), as an implication of the argument against neutrality,
is a substantive specification of the intuition of neutrality. Contentwise
(C12) is completely in line with the idea behind the intuition of neutrality
(cf. Broome, 2004, p. 146): Added lives are neutral except if they are at
a very low or very high level of well-being (Broome, 2012, p. 172), so the
neutral range is not only a proper range but also a rather big range. The
crucial message from the Corollary is that the argument against neu-
trality has a hidden premise, which has not been made explicit so far:
u1 < u2.
Even if the intuition of neutrality in this form empirically holds as a
widespread intuition, it is theoretically problematic:
• One of its implications is for example that we cannot say that a sce-
nario with many added people at the highest well-being within the
neutral range is better than a scenario with many added people
at the lowest level of well-being. This implication — that well-being
within the neutral range is incomparable — is at least controversial.
And there are other pressing theoretical questions:
• What values should u1 and u2 assume? Imagine someone pro-
posed as a specification that u1 should be, say, at the level of well-
being of the person at the top of the lowest 10% of the population
in terms of well-being. How should we respond?
– How should we know whether that is correct?
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– What kind of arguments would we have to employ in order to
plead for a higher or lower value?
– What kind of ethical principle determines the range?
These problems do not arise if we restrict the intuition of neutrality to
a single level of neutral well-being:
1. Such a restriction would directly invalidate the argument against
neutrality and circumvent the problem of the incomparability of
people within the neutral range which I have just touched upon.
2. There exists an established ethical theory which justifies the exis-
tence of this level and explains what value it should take.
The theory in (2.) is average utilitarianism and one kind of justification for
it is found in Harsanyi, 1955. Average utilitarianism is a highly controver-
sial theory, specifically but not only when it is understood as a complete
moral theory rather than only a theory of goodness (cf. Broome, 2012,
pp. 50-54; Arrhenius, Ryberg, & Ta¨nnsjo¨, 2017, sec 2.1.1; Rawls, 2005,
pp. 167-175, 572f). But it is a popular and consistent ethical theory which
is not only able to account for many other ethical intuitions but also to
answer our quantitative and justificatory questions regarding the neutral
level of well-being. The welfare function of average utilitarianism states
that general welfare is the average of all individual well-being:
Definition 5: Average utilitarianism
u(P) =
∑
p∈P
u(p)
|P|
This implies that in order to be neutral to existing welfare, the welfare
of an added population must equal the welfare of the existing popula-
tion. Not every single added person needs to be at this neutral level, but
rather the average of all added persons needs to be at this level.
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Definition 6: The neutral range in average utilitarianism
[u1, u2] = u1 = u2 = u0 = w(P)
So average utilitarianism provides a response to the argument against
neutrality by modifying the intuition of neutrality and assuming a neutral
level instead of a neutral range. As a result, the intuition is consistent, cal-
culable, and maybe even justified (regarding the justification, cf. Rawls,
2005, pp. 161-175; and also Arrhenius et al., 2017). Average utilitarianism
plays (in this case) a revisionist role, a theory of moral error (cf. Mackie,
1990, p. 35): It tells us to slightly adjust our intuition – to sharpen it – so
that it is consistent in itself and in its relation to other moral judgments.
This is an acceptable, maybe desirable intervention to the beliefs from
our intuition.
Furthermore, this theoretical sharpening would not even necessar-
ily change our application of the intuition of neutrality. This is because
in practice, uncertainties are attached to all quantities of well-being,
specifically the neutral value. When I talk of ’uncertainty’ here, then I
refer to ’measurement uncertainty’ as used in statistics and the quanti-
tative sciences. (The uncertainty in question is quantifiable, so in it falls
into the decision-theoretic category of risk and not into the decision-
theoretic category of uncertainty.) Measurement uncertainty is a well-
developed theory (see, e. g., Runge, 2007). Unlike the approaches of in-
troducing indeterminacy in the forms of incommensurateness or vague-
ness (cf. alternative (d) in section 1.3) – which are pursued and dis-
carded as a solution to the argument against neutrality in Broome, 2004,
pp. 164-183 – uncertainty does not suffer from difficult problems such as
greediness (a problem discussed in Broome, 2004, p. 170ff).
The neutral value is affected by two kinds of uncertainty:
1. The first kind of uncertainty arises from the definition of the neutral
level. Sensitivity analysis (cf. Runge, 2007) of Definition 5 tells us that
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the uncertainty of the neutral level is composed of the average
uncertainty of the well-being of all existing people.
2. The level of well-being of any actual person that is considered to
be at the neutral level or not is also subject to some uncertainty.
In both cases, the uncertainty arises from the difficulty to quan-
tify the personal well-being of existing or hypothetical persons (see
Harsanyi, 1955, p. 317-319 for discussion).
These uncertainties are not on a theoretical level. On the theoretical
level it has been questioned that such quantifications are metaphysi-
cally and psychologically possible at all (cf. Harsanyi, 1955, pp. 317-319).
– On the practical level, these quantifications are de facto happening,
but there is a great level of uncertainty attached to them (Broome, 2004,
ch. 9).
We can then accept the theoretical notion of a neutral level while
at the same time both maintaining the practical idea of the intuition of
neutrality and avoiding the argument against neutrality.
Is doing so just a sophisticated trick? No: The specific nature of the
intuition of neutrality had not been analysed before. Rather, it may have
been a bit rash to conclude from the rough idea of the intuition of neu-
trality that it has to be formalized as a proper range.
This section has explained that there is at least no obvious possibility
of justifying such a range, and that as a consequence we do not know
how to quantify the range. Average utilitarianism presents a possible
justification for a neutral level, and together with uncertainty it can justify
something like a range. This formal interpretation may be even closer
to the empirical intuition of neutrality than the interpretation as a real
range is. If it is not, the problem of the incomparability within the neutral
range and the problem of the quantifiability of the neutral range present
compelling reasons why we should adjust our intuitions.
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2.3 Relativism
While sections 2.1 and 2.2 examine how two different welfare functions
affect the result of the comparison of scenarios with a changing popula-
tion, this section investigates which persons are to be regarded in such
comparisons. We will see that the argument against neutrality makes
some controversial implicit assumptions about which persons are to be
regarded; a modification of these assumptions may therefore avoid the
argument against neutrality, regardless of the chosen welfare function.
The difference principle and average utilitarianism are probably the
two most prominent welfare functions. In both of them the argument
against neutrality does not hold for different reasons. Yet, although these
frameworks are so well received, they both raise the question of how
they should be justified. The specific justificatory problem which matters
in our context is that the frameworks assume a universal moral domain.
This means that they assume that in the first place every person should
receive moral consideration. If the universal domain is rejected, the re-
sults of sections 2.1 and 2.2 will no longer matter. We will now see that
the argument against neutrality fails if the universal domain is rejected,
and afterwards we will discuss whether such a relativistic position is ac-
ceptable. In the context of this section, ’relativism’ refers to the proce-
dure of undertaking ethical evaluations with respect to a certain (tem-
porally limited) population rather than with respect to all persons ever
existing. In a relativistic interpretation, ’goodness’ is to be understood
as ’goodness for someone or some group’, and in our context usually
as ’goodness for the current (world) population’. This form of relativism is
more precisely referred to as metaethical relativism (cf. Westacott, 2019,
ch. 2e; Gowans, 2019, ch. 2).
So far we have interpreted the intuition of neutrality as a principle
which is applied only in a particular instance of comparisons between
welfare in different scenarios: Whenever there are additional persons in
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one scenario who do not exist in the other scenario, then we can apply
the intuition of neutrality. This is reflected in the reasoning in Proof 1: In
(C3) and (C4) we have used the intuition of neutrality because there is
a different number of persons in scenario A than there is in scenarios B
and C. But in (C7) we have been comparing scenarios B and C, and
these scenarios have the same number of persons, so we had to take
into account the well-being of all people: ”B and C contain the very
same five people, so in comparing their values all five count as existing
people.” (Broome, 2012, p. 177)
A simple escape from the argument against neutrality would be to
deny that in such cases all people count as existing people. If we re-
gard person q (the person who exists in scenarios B and C only) as non-
existent, then we cannot derive that C is better than B by direct com-
parison (C7), and the argument fails:
Proof 2: Failing modification of the argument against neutrality
Assume (C1) – (C6) from proof 1. Assuming that q is disregarded
in the comparison between B and C, we do not arrive at (C7),
(C8), and consequently (C9); but rather at the different conclu-
sions (C7’) and (C8’) from which the result of (C9) cannot be de-
duced. This means that the proof fails under the modified assump-
tion.
That q is disregarded from the comparison between B and C for-
mally follows from (P5): ’A is the base scenario.’ This additional
premise will be introduced and discussed below.
(C7’) (A1) ∧ (A2) ∧ (A3) ∧ (P1) ∧ (P5)
⇒ uB(P0 ∪ P+) > uC (P0 ∪ P+)
(C8’) (C4)⇔ (C7′)
If we want to disregard person q in the comparison between sce-
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narios B and C, we need a revised version of the intuition of neutrality
(Definition 2; Premise 1). The differences to the original formulation in
Definition 2 are highlighted in yellow.
Definition 7: The intuition of neutrality (revised)
∃u1, u2 :
(∀x ∈ P+ : uB(x) ∈ [u1, u2])→
(uB(P0) > uA(P0)→ uB(P0 ∪ P+) > uA(P0 ∪P+ )) ∧
(uB(P0) < uA(P0)→ uB(P0 ∪ P+) < uA(P0 ∪P+ ))
In the definition above, the intuition has been modified in a way such
that it also applies to comparisons where the persons are the same in
both scenarios (such as in the comparison between scenarios A and B).
As shown in 2, this avoids the argument against neutrality.
But while this solution may be compelling so far, it brings with it a for-
mal problem. In the original definition of the intuition of neutrality (Defini-
tion 2), we have not really needed to specify P0 and P+: P0 has been the
population which exists in both scenarios and P+ has been the popula-
tion which exists only in scenario B. This is no longer implicit in Definition 7:
P0 and P+ both exist in both scenarios; they are not distinguished by the
definition. P+ are the people who are neutral with respect to general
welfare if their well-being lies within the neutral range; and P+ are the
same people in B and in C. But P+ could be any persons: P+ could be
all persons, no persons, or an arbitrary selection of persons. So as they
are not already formally specified we need to specify P+:
Definition 8: Additional specification of the intuition of neutrality
P0 are the existing people and P+ are the non-existing people.
This definition is completely in the spirit of the original intuition of neu-
trality: The intuition is originally about existing and non-existing people.
Unlike all the formal definitions above, this is a material definition,
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which is not a problem. The problem is that it is also a time-relative def-
inition. Which people are existing and which are not depends on the
time of evaluation.
Example: Time-relativity
When we consider whether it is good or not that a baby is born,
we arrive at different evaluations before and after the pregnancy
of the baby’s parent. Before the pregnancy, the baby’s well-
being has to be ignored because of the intuition of neutrality, but
after the pregnancy, the baby’s well-being has to be considered.
Imagine that we want to know whether it is positive or negative for
the general welfare whether the baby suffers from a chronic dis-
ease. Then before the pregnancy we will derive that the chronic
disease is neutral with respect to general welfare and after the
pregnancy we will derive that it would be better for general wel-
fare if the baby did not suffer from the disease.
The evaluation of welfare depends on what scenario we use as a
base scenario based on which we judge which persons are existent and
which are not. (This has been suggested by Stefan Fischer in a discus-
sion.) Such a base scenario may be either of the scenarios which we
compare, or a third scenario. In the case of the argument of neutral-
ity, we need to choose scenario A as our base scenario so that we can
arrive at the alternative conclusion (C8’).
Premise 5: Base scenario (P5)
A is the base scenario, with the corresponding distribution uA of
well-being.
The additional specification and the additional premise are a form of
metaethical relativism: We have to choose a base scenario, for which
the ethical evaluation is conducted. This scenario will usually be our
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own, current scenario, because we are interested in persons which are
added to our own, current population. P0 will thus be the current world
population, and P+ will be some potential additional future population.
If the question wil be discussed again in ten years, then the society exist-
ing in ten years will read P0 as the population then existing, and P+ as a
potential additional future population that comes into being later than
ten years from today.
Moreover – and now things are getting complicated – when our so-
ciety in ten years deliberates about the decisions taken today, they will
have to employ their own standard from their own time: This means,
they will count both the current population and all people coming into
existence between now and ten years from now as P0 when they want
to arrive at their own normative evaluations. Only if they want to evalu-
ate the current decisions from the perspective of the current population
(which is usually a question of minor interest), the future population will,
just like us today, use P0 to refer to the current population.
A similar approach to the described relativism is pursued in Broome,
2004, pp. 157-162. There it is discarded for two reasons:
1. Because of the incoherence which arises when switching the base
scenario (pp. 68-76).
2. Because of the difficulty to ethically justify person-relativity or com-
munity-relativity (p. 161f).
I will now address both issues.
The problem of incoherence cannot be denied: If ethical evaluations
of welfare depend on the choice of the base scenario and if every per-
son chooses the person’s own (current) situation as the base scenario,
incoherence will arise. Principally, there are relativistic inconsistencies
of several kinds. E. g., one person could contradict another person from
the same population. As we are concerned with population ethics here,
where persons will usually somehow consider the whole population for
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their evaluation, this is not necessarily a problem. A necessary problem is
the time-dependence of the evaluation, which is pointed out in Broome,
2004, p. 75:
”You choose rightly, but it later turns out you chose wrongly.
Indeed, it may turn out that you ought later to undo what you
rightly did. Moreover, you might be able to foresee even as
you choose [your action] that just this would happen. This is a
most implausible sort of incoherence in your activity.”
This criticism of time-relativity sounds like a problem at first, but I will
now try to plausibilize that it might be acceptable.
One possible defence of time-relativity is in denying that incoher-
ence between actions is a problem at all. Incoherent actions are some-
times criticized in everyday situations; for example, when two persons
or one person act out two actions which appear to follow opposite in-
tentions, we might say that the actions are incoherent (or inconsistent).
But the conceptual basis for such ascriptions is rather fuzzy and the exist-
ing theory of rationality does not provide a criterion for directly identify-
ing incoherent actions. What the theory of rationality does provide is a
criterion for identifying incoherent beliefs: Beliefs are incoherent if their
propositional contents are contradictory. The only philosophically devel-
oped theory for criticizing inconsistent actions is (to my knowledge) to
criticize inconsistencies in the belief set motivating the action (cf. Wilson
& Shpall, 2016, ch. 4).
The underlying beliefs in a situation of alleged incoherence due to
time-relativistic reasoning are complex: Before action A, we think that
we should do A. And we think that as a causal effect of doing A, we will
regret having done A. So we think that we should do A, and that we will
regret it afterwards. After the action A, we think that we should not have
done A. We also think that we have thought that we should do A. The
point is that there is no apparent formal contradiction within this belief
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set. – It may very well be rational to think A at the moment and to expect
that oneself would think the opposite of A under different circumstances.
As the enactment of A causes a change of circumstances, the complex
belief set above may come about, and there is nothing wrong with it.
Similarly, one may deny that it is irrational to undo an action (cf.
Broome, 2004, p. 75). A is done within one set of circumstances and then
within another set of circumstances it is undone. The two actions of ’do-
ing A’ and ’undoing A’ can be differentiated by the fact that they have
taken place within different contexts (one context without the causal
effects of A and one context with the causal effects of A). There is no
obvious reason to ignore the contexts of the actions and to strip them
down to the notions of ’doing A’ and ’undoing A’, creating a possibly
false dichotomy.
The above argumentation – that the apparent incoherence due to
temporal relativity is not irrational – will certainly be highly controver-
sial. But it is much more plausible that it applies to group beliefs and
group actions. And it is group actions towards which the criticism of
population-relativity in Broome, 2004, pp. 157-162 is directed.
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Example: Coherence of group actions
As an illustration, imagine a direct democracy called Alphaland
whose citizens consider – say, because of their liberal ideal – to
invade and annex an autocratic country called Betaland with
a population bigger than their own population. They consensu-
ally adopt a resolution: ”Alphaland wants to annex Betaland. Al-
phaland expects Betaland to condemn the violence related to
the annexation. As the current citizens of Betaland will be the
majority in Alphaland after the annexation, we expect that Al-
phaland will officially regret the annexation afterwards. But we
expect that most former Betaland citizens will nonetheless want
to remain in Alphaland for pragmatic reasons (so the annexation
would not be without effect).” It is plausible that rationality does
not require present Alphaland to consider the interest of future
Alphaland. After all, future Alphaland is made up of different citi-
zens than present Alphaland. This example illustrates that there is
no requirement for communities to be coherent with their beliefs
and expected beliefs over time.
One might object to the above example: ”If Alphaland was a single
person, we would criticize the annexation as irrational.” But this objection
is beyond the point: Groups, though they may be identified – analogous
to single persons – by names, do not possess beliefs in the same sense
that persons do. This becomes apparent in situations like voting, where,
for example, the voting paradox leads to counterintuitive conclusions
(cf. List, 2013, ch. 1.1). And group actions also belie one’s expectations
with respect to temporal coherence. Even if the rationality constraints
of temporal coherence may apply for individual persons (which I have
questioned above), they do not for groups.
The previous paragraphs have been about the coherence of group
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beliefs. One might object: Are we not concerned with general ethical
belief, which one would assume to be independent from the practical
belief of some community? The answer is that in metaethical relativism
all ethical evaluations depend on the fact which scenario is the base
scenario, and the choice of the base scenario depends on the own,
current population.
After I have defended the form of metaethical relativism which comes
along with Definitions 7, 8 and Premise 5, I will end with some brief re-
marks regarding the justificatory status of metaethical relativism. Rela-
tivism is dropped in Broome, 2004, p. 160f, mainly because of (1) the
alleged incoherence discussed above and (2) the lack of justification
for the required form of metaethical relativism. Regarding (2), there
are indeed good reasons why metaethical relativism is preferable to
other preferable positions. I point towards the argument from queer-
ness and the argument from relativity found in Mackie, 1990, part 1 and
summarized in Joyce, 2016, supp. 2. The contractarian tradition within
ethics is closely associated with metaethical relativism (including time-
relativism). One sophisticated contemporary ethical framework based
on metaethical relativism is presented in Stemmer, 2013. These refer-
ences shall suffice to make clear that the justificatory status of metaethi-
cal relativism needs not be considered problematic, but to the contrary
can be seen as very satisfactory.
Even more than the arguments in sections 2.1 and 2.2, the argumen-
tation in this section touches upon several philosophical controversies,
notably whether metaethical time-relativism is coherent and whether it
is justified. The result is that if both questions can be answered with yes,
the argument against neutrality is undermined. This is because metaeth-
ical time-relativism allows us to modify the intuition of neutrality in a way
that is consistent with its original intention and which avoids the argu-
ment against neutrality by relying on a base scenario.
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Conclusion
This thesis has formally presented the framework of welfare economics,
the intuition of neutrality, and the argument against (the intuition of)
neutrality. It has proceded by critically analyzing the impact of three
(meta)ethical frameworks on the soundness of the argument against
neutrality, with the following results:
1. The difference principle in its Leximin formulation is in contradiction
to the principle of fair aggregation, which is a premise for the argu-
ment against neutrality. The argument against neutrality therefore
does not hold when assuming the difference principle.
2. The argument against neutrality has the implicit premise that the
neutral range within which persons can be added to a population
is a proper range. Average utilitarianism suggests to slightly modify
the intuition of neutrality so that it uses a neutral level rather than
a proper neutral range. Because of the uncertainty involved, this
is in practice somewhat similar to the original intuition of neutrality.
The argument against neutrality therefore does not hold when as-
suming average utilitarianism and slightly adjusting the intuition of
neutrality accordingly.
3. Assuming metaethical time-relativism (as is usually the case in con-
tractarian theories), the intuition of neutrality can be modified by
introducing a base scenario for comparisons. This modification is in
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line with the spirit of the original intuition of neutrality. The argument
against neutrality does not hold when assuming this modification.
This means that in any of the three frameworks – difference principle,
average utilitarianism, implementations of metaethical relativism such
as moral contractarianism – the argument against neutrality does not
hold. These frameworks do not present a complete partition of ethical
beliefs, but they are major ethical frameworks.
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3 3 5 Utilitarianism with contractarian justification Harsanyi, 1955 3
3 5 3 Difference principle with contractarian justification Rawls, 2005 3
3 5 5 Contractarianism with other or no welfare function Stemmer, 2000 3
5 3 5 Utilitarianism with other justification Mill, 2016 3
5 5 3 Difference principle with other justification cf. Pomerenke, 2017 3
5 5 5 Other moral framework ... ?
Possible combinations of the three ethical frameworks of contractarianism (in a metaethically
time-relative version), average utilitarianism, and the difference principle; along with a short
characterization; one exemplary theoretical text; and the compatibility with the intuition of neutrality.
(Mill, 2016 is classified as average utilitarian in Myrdal, 2017, p; 38.)
As a result, the intuition of neutrality can be assumed in these frame-
works. Whether the intuition of neutrality should be adopted is left open
in this thesis. Assuming that ethics is a system which should be built up
from people’s ethical convictions (a controversial claim on its own), an
investigation into the empirical prevalence of the intuition should be
conducted. If the intuition of neutrality is considered correct, it might
simplify calculations with regard to pressing problems such as global
warming.
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